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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL WAR: THE 
GREAT EMANCIPATOR AS CIVIL 
LIBERTARIAN 
Paul Finkelman* 
THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES. 
By Mark E. Neely, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. 
Pp. xvii, 278. $24.95. 
Abraham Lincoln remains the great enigma of American history.I 
When nominated for the presidency he seemed almost laughable. An 
uneducated hick from the plains of Illinois, Lincoln was too tall, too 
awkward, and far too homely. He had made some impressive speeches 
while campaigning for the nomination, and he was "unsurpassed when 
it came to elucidating the moral principles and goals of Republican-
ism. "2 But it was still hard to take this unpolished prairie lawyer seri-
ously. The abolitionist Wendell Phillips, who was also a Harvard-
trained lawyer, asked: "Who is this huckster in politics . . . this 
county court advocate?"3 
Never had so inexperienced a man seriously competed for the pres-
idency. His resume was spare: a one-term congressman, a failed can-
didate for the Senate, and a successful but hardly imposing railroad 
lawyer. Phillips concluded that the Republican candidate was "a first-
rate second-rate man."4 
In 1860, within the Republican Party, Lincoln was a moderate, at 
best, on race and slavery. More prominent party leaders, like William 
H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, actively opposed slavery. As gover-
nors, both had refused to extradite to the South free blacks who were 
wanted for helping slaves escape to their states. 5 As lawyers, they had 
• Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. B.A. 
1971, Syracuse University; Ph.D. 1976, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
1. The biographical literature on Lincoln is enormous. The best modern scholarly biography 
is STEPHEN B. OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
(1977). For understanding Lincoln's presidency in a larger context, see James M. McPherson's 
brilliant BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1988). 
2. OATES, supra note l, at 175. 
3. Wendell Phillips, quoted in IRVING H. BARTLETI, WENDELL PHILLIPS: BRAHMIN RADI· 
CAL 221 (1961). 
4. Wendell Phillips, quoted in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRAD!· 
TION 150 (1948). 
5. On Seward, see Paul Finkelman, The Protection of Black Rights in Seward's New York, 34 
C1v. WAR HIST. 211 (1988). Chase's refusal to extradite to Kentucky a free black named Willis 
Lago set the stage for Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), overruled by Puerto 
Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), in which Chief Justice Roger B. Taney held that a gover-
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represented abolitionists accused of aiding runaway slaves. 6 Chase 
was involved in so many slavery cases that he was known as the "At-
torney General for Fugitive Slaves."7 
Lincoln hated slavery and opposed its spread to new territories, 
but unlike most leading Republicans, he still advocated colonization of 
former slaves outside the United States, and he opposed political 
rights for free blacks. Moreover, as an attorney he had never been 
terribly scrupulous about the cases he took. In 1841 he successfully 
helped a black woman gain her freedom, 8 but six years later - when 
men like Chase and Seward were solidifying their reputations as pow-
erful antislavery advocates - Lincoln represented a slaveowner trying 
to regain custody of a slave he had brought to Illinois.9 As a congress-
man, Lincoln proposed a bill allowing Washington D.C. officials to 
return fugitive slaves to southern masters.10 As a presidential candi-
date, he did not demand repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law. Small won-
der Wendell Phillips called Lincoln "[t]he Slave-Hound of Illinois."11 
In 1860 Lincoln's greatest qualification for the presidency was his 
availability. The leading contenders were either too radical or too 
conservative to have any chance of winning the general election. Not 
part of any Republican faction, he "had no ideological image within 
the party."12 Lincoln's obscurity worked in his favor, gaining him the 
nomination, virtually all of the North's electoral votes, and the elec-
tion.13 But how would this inexperienced "second-rate man" with no 
ideological moorings run the country? 
I. THE HEROIC LINCOLN 
Lincoln of course confounded and surprised both his critics and 
his friends. He turned out to be a first-rate man, unquestionably the 
nor could not be compelled by an act of Congress or judicial authority to extradite an alleged 
fugitive from another state. 
6. Seward argued Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847), before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Chase had argued the case in the lower court, 13 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 
7501), 13 F. Cas. 1047 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501), and submitted a brief in the Supreme 
Court appeal. Their Supreme Court briefs are reprinted in 1 FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN 
COURTS 341, 449 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). Chase also successfully argued Norris v. Crocker, 
54 U.S (13 How.) 429 (1851), which involved Crocker's civil liability for helping Norris's slaves 
escape. For a detailed discussion of that case, see Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern 
Racial Tolerance, and the Value of "Justice Delayed," 78 IOWA L. REV. 89 (1992). At the state 
level, Chase successfully argued Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837). 
7. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 157 
(1981). 
8. Bailey v. Cromwell, 4 Ill. 70, 3 Scam. 71 (1841). 
9. In re Jane, 5 Western L.J. 202 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1848). For a discussion of this case, see 
FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 149-50 n.8, 152-53. 
10. BARTLETI, supra note 3, at 222. 
11. Id. 
12. OATES, supra note 1, at 182. 
13. Id. at 182, 190. New Jersey had split its votes between Lincoln and Douglas. 
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nation's greatest president, who successfully and compassionately 
guided the United States through its greatest crisis. In articulating the 
reasons for maintaining the Union, Lincoln reinterpreted the meaning 
of America, as a "nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal."I4 
On slavery and race Lincoln ultimately surprised everyone, Is 
growing to understand not only that slavery "was, somehow, the cause 
of the war,"I6 but also that slavery had to end and blacks had some-
how to be incorporated into American society to make America whole 
again. This represented an enormous transition for Lincoln. In his 
Illinois days Lincoln's views and actions had reflected the racism of 
his environment and his constituents. I7 During his debates with Ste-
phen A. Douglas, Lincoln reiterated his opposition to black suffrage 
and general social equality: 
I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the 
social and political equality of the white and black races, - that I am 
not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, 
nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white 
people.18 · 
But, even while taking this position on race, Lincoln was more pro-
gressive than most of his Illinois neighbors. 19 - Lincoln argued that 
blacks had certain fundamental natural rights, including "all the 
rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence."20 This put 
him light years ahead of Douglas and Illinois Democrats.2I 
Lincoln's commitment to natural rights - "his basic equalitarian-
ism"22 - made him receptive to new views of race, even if he had to 
14. Abraham Lincoln, Final Text, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 
Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863) in 7 THE CoLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. 
Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter WORKS OF LINCOLN]. 
15. Except perhaps the Southern extremists, who left the Union because they incorrectly 
believed Lincoln was an abolitionist who would end slavery. See OATES, supra note 1, at 187-88. 
By leaving the Union and starting the War, the proslavery Southern nationalists set the stage for 
the fulfillment of their own worst nightmare. 
16. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) in 8 WORKS OF LINCOLN, 
supra note 14, at 332. 
17. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Charleston (Sept. 18, 1858) in 3 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra 
note 14, at 145. 
18. Id. 
19. On racism in Illinois, see EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY 
(1967). For a view that modifies Berwanger's argument, see Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 
415-82 (1986). 
20. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Quincy (Oct. 13, 1858) in 3 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra 
note 14, at 249. 
21. For a discussion of Lincoln's generally progressive views on race in comparison to Doug-
las' views, see Finkelman, supra note 19, at 418-19. 
22. LA WANDA Cox, LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM: A STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL LEAD-
ERSHIP 20 (1981). 
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overcome his long-held personal prejudices.23 Within a few years Lin-
coln became the first president to receive a black at the White House 
to discuss political issues.24 More importantly, he supported the en-
listment of black troops at a time when many Northerners doubted 
that blacks could or should serve as soldiers.25 Lincoln understood 
that, by fighting for the Union, black soldiers were staking a claim that 
society could not easily deny.26 By 1865 Lincoln supported suffrage, 
at the very least, for black veterans. 27 
By 1863 this "Slave-Hound of Illinois" had become the "Great 
Emancipator." With the stroke of his pen (and the power of the 
swords of Generals Grant, Sherman, and others) Lincoln brought 
more liberty to more people than anyone else in American history. 
War measure though it was,28 inelegantly written, and not the stuff of 
heroic language, the Emancipation Proclamation29 nevertheless made 
liberty meaningful to nearly four million blacks. 30 Through the Proc-
lamation, the confiscation acts, 31 and the enlistment of black soldiers, 
Lincoln's administration set the stage for the adoption of three consti-
tutional amendments that gave some substance to a new birth of free-
23. Id. at 25; see also Phillip Shaw Paludan, Hercules Unbound: Lincoln, Slavery, and the 
Intentions of the Framers, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL AS-
PECTS OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 14-15 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992). 
24. The caller was Frederick Douglass. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 347-48 (reprinted 1962 (1892)); OATES, supra note 1, at 385. 
25. See generally DUDLEY T. CORNISH, THE SABLE ARM: NEGRO TROOPS IN THE UNION 
ARMY, 1861-1865 (1956) (discussing the political process leading to the acceptance of blacks 
within the union forces, and the practical implementation of this goal); JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR, 
FORGED IN BATTLE: THE CIVIL WAR ALLIANCE OF BLACK SOLDIERS AND WHITE OFFICERS 
(1990) (exploring the relationships between black soldiers and their officers, and their under· 
standings of the impact of the war on perceptions of race and racial equality). 
26. Cox, supra note 22, at 23. The current opposition to allowing gays and lesbians to join 
the military may stem from this understanding as well. If gays and lesbians can claim the status 
of veterans, then denying them full equality and full protection of the law in civilian society is all 
the more difficult. This does not mean that antigay discrimination will disappear with a change 
in the law any more than racism disappeared when blacks joined the Union forces. My point is 
simply that open and legal military service of gays and lesbians severely undermines the self· 
styled moral position of homophobes. 
27. "It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored 
man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who 
serve our cause as soldiers." Abraham Lincoln, Last Public Address (Apr. 11, 1865) in 8 WORKS 
OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 403. 
28. Among the many reasons given for the proclamation are military necessity, desperation, 
political necessity, and, of course, higher moral values. My own view is that Lincoln understood 
the moral necessity of ending slavery long before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation but 
that political and military considerations forced him to delay any direct assault on slavery. 
29. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863), in 6 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 
28. 
30. On the history of the Proclamation itself, see JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPA• 
TION PROCLAMATION (1963). 
31. Confiscation Act, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (Aug. 6, 1861); Second Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 
12 Stat. 589 (July 17, 1862). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these acts in 
Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871). 
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dom in the nineteenth century and provided the basis for at least 
formal legal equality in the late twentieth century. 
Such then is the majestic Lincoln, the heroic president, the great 
emancipator. This is the Lincoln who sits on a marble throne in his 
memorial in Washington. More than any other great president, Lin-
coln's record as a leader and a human being stands up over time. 
Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote beautiful phrases about liberty, 
while never lifting a finger to combat slavery.32 Lincoln's record as a 
leader on emancipation and racial fairness, on the other hand, is actu-
ally better than his rhetoric. He did more than he said, and when he 
said he was doing nothing, he was often preparing to take action. 33 
On the vital issues of his day - and our own - no American leader 
stands up as well as Lincoln to probing historical scholarship or moral 
scrutiny. 
II. LINCOLN: THE DARKER SIDE 
Yet, lurking in the shadows of the great Lincoln there has always 
been a more sinister image of the sixteenth president. This is the presi-
dent who suspended habeas corpus throughout the nation and ran 
roughshod over civil liberties; the president whose generals shut down 
opposition newspapers,34 arrested civilians, and expelled Jews from 
their homes.35 Under the influence of the administration's dark side, 
32. Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in 
JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993). Similarly, he wrote brilliant arguments 
in favor of civil liberties, while at the same time secretly pushing for the suppression of his 
opponents. LEONARD w. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963). 
As I will discuss later, Lincoln never sought to suppress political opponents, and he authorized 
suppression of civil liberties only over issues of national concern, not his own ego. More impor-
tantly, he curtailed liberties in the open, taking full responsibility. 
33. For example, in August 1862 Lincoln declared that he had no plans to end slavery. Let-
ter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), in 5 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra 
note 14, at 388-89. But at the time he had already written the Emancipation Proclamation and 
was simply waiting for the right time to announce it. Emancipation Proclamation - First Draft 
(July 22, 1862), id. at 336-37. 
34. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix (May 18, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF LINCOLN, 
supra note 14, at 347-48, (ordering Dix to arrest the editors of the New York World and the 
Journal of Commerce and seize the papers' offices). On the other hand, in June 1863 Major 
General A.E. Burnside suppressed the Chicago Times, but Lincoln quickly had this order coun-
termanded. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 229-32 (Har-
old L. Nelson ed., 1967). 
35. On December 17, 1862, in General Orders Number 11, Major General Ulysses S. Grant 
declared: 
The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Depart-
ment, and also Department orders, are hereby expelled from the Department. . . . Within 
twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order by Post Commanders, they will see that all 
of this class of people are furnished with passes and required to leave, and any one returning 
after such notification, will be arrested and held in confinement until an opportunity occurs 
of sending them out as prisoners unless furnished with permits from these Head Quarters. 
. . . No permits will be given these people to visit Head Quarters for the purpose of making 
personal application for trade permits. 
7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES s. GRANT, DECEMBER 9, 1862-MARCH 31, 1863, at 50 (John Y. 
1358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1353 
Lincoln's minions arrested opposition politicians, critical newspaper 
editors, and obscure opponents of his administration. Thus, his 
hometown Springfield Register described Lincoln as "the ineffable des-
pot, who, by some inscrutable dispensation of providence presides over 
the destinies of this vast republic."36 
In The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties, Mark 
E. Neely, Jr.37 offers the best overall study yet written of the Lincoln 
administration and the problem of civil liberties during wartime. 
Neely's great contribution comes from his careful examination of the 
records of thousands of people arrested and incarcerated by military 
and civilian authorities during the war. 
Lincoln's critics assert that he directed the arrests of thousands of 
civilians in order to maintain power, 38 allowed for the military prose-
cution of civilians,39 and created a regime aptly dubbed an American 
Bastil[l]e. 40 Lost-cause partisans and popular writers have kept alive 
the image of Lincoln as an oppressive dictator. According to novelist 
Gore Vidal, Lincoln was "able to make himself absolute dictator with-
out ever letting anyone suspect that he was anything more than a jok-
ing, timid backwoods lawyer .... "41 Vidal's fictional Lincoln 
reflected literary critic Edmund Wilson's description of Lincoln as a 
dictatorial precursor of Bismarck and Lenin, who was "succeeded by 
agencies which continued to exercise this power and to manipulate the 
peoples he had been unifying in a stupid, despotic and unscrupulous 
fashion."42 In Wilson's paranoid view, Lincoln not only denied his 
own citizens civil liberties but set into motion the forces that led to the 
I.R.S., the F.B.I., and countless federal bureaucracies. 
Simon ed., 1979) [hereinafter PAPERS OF ULYSSES s. GRANT]. In Paducah, Kentucky, Grant's 
subordinates expelled a number of Jews, including two Union veterans. When Lincoln found out 
about this, he ordered Grant to revoke the orders. BERTRAM w. KORN, AMERICAN JEWRY 
AND THE CIVIL WAR (1951). 
36. DAILY ILLINOIS STATE REGISTER (Springfield), Aug. 7, 1864, quoted in ROBERT s. 
HARPER, LINCOLN AND THE PRESS 224 (1951). 
37. John Francis Bannon Professor of History and American Studies, St. Louis University. 
38. Neely argues that relatively few Democratic politicians were arrested under Lincoln, and 
the burden of his book is to show that the civilian arrests were nonpartisan. P. xii. However, 
Neely also acknowledges that some zealous local commanders ordered the arrest of Democratic 
politicians for partisan reasons. Pp. 56-58. 
39. The best-known example of this led to Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see 
also Frank L. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials and Ex parte Milligan, in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL TRIALS 101 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981). 
40. JOHN A. MARSHALL, AMERICAN BASTILE (1883). 
41. GORE VIDAL, LINCOLN: A NOVEL 459 (1984). 
42. EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERI-
CAN CIVIL WAR xviii (1962), quoted at p. 231. 
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A. The Merryman and Milligan Cases and the Case 
Against Lincoln 
1359 
Critics of Lincoln frequently employ two cases, Ex parte Mer-
ryman 43 and Ex parte Milligan, 44 to confirm their image of Lincoln as 
an authoritarian devoid of any appreciation of civil liberties and the 
rule of law.45 
Merryman appears to reveal the epitome of an imperial president 
ignoring the rule of law. Shortly after the firing on Fort Sumter, Lin-
coln authorized the military to suspend "the writ of Habeas Corpus 
for the public safety" between Philadelphia and Washington.46 Lin-
coln did this on his own, without consulting Congress, which was out 
of session.47 
At 2:00 a.m. on May 25, soldiers arrested John Merryman for 
"drilling Marylanders in a scheme to take them south and join the 
Confederate army" (p. 10). Merryman was a member of the Mary-
land legislature and a captain in a state militia unit.48 While incarcer-
ated in Fort McHenry, Merryman obtained from Chief Justice Roger 
B. Taney a writ of habeas corpus directed at General George Cadwala-
der, the commander of the military district. Cadwalader refused to 
appear before Taney but sent a subordinate to inform the Chief Justice 
that Merryman was charged with treason and that the army had sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus under Lincoln's orders.49 Taney re-
sponded with a published opinion, castigating Lincoln for suspending 
the writ in violation of the Constitution. so Lincoln neither obeyed this 
opinion nor directly responded to it; he simply ignored it.51 
For modem Americans, Lincoln's actions regarding Merryman 
seem to confirm his dark side. He had unilaterally suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus. Then he ordered his generals to disobey the Chief 
43. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). For a discussion of 
Merryman, see HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 238-41 (1982); 5 CARL B. SWISHER, OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864, at 844-54 (1974). 
44. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see also Klement, supra note 39, at 101. 
45. Merryman and Milligan are but the tip of an iceberg of civilian arrests. Standard histo-
ries of the War put the number of civilian arrests at over 13,500. The book contains a delightful 
account of the way in which this erroneous figure found its way into virtually all scholarly studies 
of the subject. Pp. 115-19. Neely himself estimates that "far more than" this number of arrests 
probably took place. P. 130. 
46. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 WORKS OF LIN-
COLN, supra note 14, at 347. 
47. This in itself might appear to exemplify Lincoln's disregard for constitutional rights, but, 
as I will suggest, such an interpretation cannot hold up under careful scrutiny. 
48. 5 SWISHER, supra note 43, at 844-45. · 
49. Id. at 845. 
50. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
51. McPHERSON, supra note l, at 288-89. 
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Justice of the United States. This was not the rule of law, but the rule 
of a single man. 
Ex parte Milligan seems equally troublesome. Lambdin P. Milli-
gan was a minor Indiana Democratic politician who opposed the war, 
Republicans, and Lincoln. In December 1864, a military commission 
in Indiana sentenced him to death for his allegedly treasonous activi-
ties. Although the civilian courts were fully functional in Indiana, fed-
eral officials, at the prompting of Indiana Republican leaders, insisted 
on trying Milligan before a military commission. s2 · 
After the war the Supreme Court overturned Milligan's convic-
tion, ruling that the military did not have the power to try civilians 
where the civilian courts were functioning.s3 But the blot on Lincoln's 
record is clear. His policies allowed Milligan to be tried by a military 
commission rather than by a civilian court. Lincoln could easily have 
intervened to end such proceedings or have had them shifted to civil-
ian courts. Equally damning, clear political overtones enveloped Mil-
ligan's prosecution. He was an active Democrat. Indiana Republicans 
pushed for the prosecution, which began in the fall of 1864, so as to 
affect the election. Furthermore, unlike John Merryman, who had 
been recruiting soldiers for the Confederacy at a time when Maryland 
might very well have gone over to the other side, Milligan's plot con-
tained little substance. His "conspiracy" turns out to have been more 
of a comic opera than a real threat to the nation. s4 
In general, critics level three traditional charges against Lincoln. 
First, his administration's wholesale disregard for civilian rights cre-
ated a police state in the Nation. Merryman's early morning arrest by 
soldiers illustrates this allegation. Second, Lincoln used military ar-
rests and arbitrary civilian arrests to stifle the political opposition. 
Milligan, the Democratic politician arrested before the 1864 election 
and tried by the military, certainly fits into that category. Third, the 
opposition press suffered grievously under Lincoln. During the war 
the administration arrested editors, and generals sometimes took it 
upon themselves to arrest editors or shut down opposition papers. Il-
lustrative of this is Lincoln's letter to Major General John A. Dix, 
ordering him to arrest the editors of the New York World and the 
Journal of Commerce, and seize the papers' offices, for publishing a 
"false and spurious proclamation purporting to be signed by the Presi-
dent ... which publication is of a treasonable nature ... . "ss 
52. Klement, supra note 39, at 109-11. 
53. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
54. Klement, supra note 39, at 107-08, 111-13. 
55. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix, (May 18, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF LINCOLN, 
supra note 14, at 347-48. Most of the correspondence and other material connected to this case 
is conveniently collected in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN 
COURT, supra note 34, at 232-47. 
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B. Neely's Answer and the Problem of Defining the Problem 
In The Fate of Liberty Neely vigorously argues that the traditional 
image of Lincoln and civil liberties is false. The key question for 
Neely is whether Lincoln suspended habeas corpus for partisan polit-
ical purposes, or merely to secure the safety of Washington. Neely's 
careful analysis of arrest records supports his contention that 
"[s]uspending the writ of habeas corpus was not originally a political 
measure, and it would never become primarily political" (p. 9). He 
also argues that, while the total number of civilian arrests under Lin-
coln vastly exceeds what other scholars have found, these arrests "had 
less significance for traditional civil liberty than anyone has realized" 
(p. 138). 
Neely's important new research proves his first point so success-
fully that I doubt anyone will ever again seriously argue the other side. 
Neely shows that the vast majority of those arrested were inconse-
quential individuals, charged with such mundane offenses as draft eva-
sion, desertion, running the federal blockade of southern ports, trading 
with the Confederacy, fraud in government contracts, or being citizens 
of the Confederacy (pp. 131-38). Furthermore, he shows that, with 
the exception of draft evaders and deserters, the overwhelming major-
ity of those arrested were either from the Confederate states or the 
border slave states, and that they were arrested in areas that were "in 
Rebellion" or in combat zones. 56 While the suspension of habeas 
corpus was not "primarily political," more political arrests occurred, 
and their significance may be greater than Neely acknowledges. This 
is especially true for arrests of newspaper editors, the one significant 
category that Neely ignores. 
Neely's second point, on the arrests' significance for civil liberties, 
is more problematic. Neely seems to argue that, because most of the 
arrests were not blatantly political, they did not violate civil liberties. 
This, however, is not necessarily so. Arbitrary arrests are still arbi-
trary and unfair, even if the motivations for them are noble and 
nonpolitical. The lack of due process for an alleged blockade runner 
or an alleged military deserter is just as much a violation of civil liber-
ties as is the arbitrary arrest of someone for giving a political speech. 
If by civil liberties Neely means freedom of expression, then his point is 
well taken, although undermined by his failure to examine suppression 
of the press during the war. But this is a cramped notion of civil 
liberties. 
Despite these caveats and criticisms, Neely makes a very important 
contribution to our understanding of Lincoln, the Civil War, and the 
problem of civil liberties during wartime. Neely's story shows a con-
56. I believe that the nature of the war made arrests in those areas quite different from arrests 
in the North. See infra text accompanying notes 64-68. 
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fused administration with uncertain policies. It also demonstrates the 
importance of maintaining due process and civil liberties during 
wartime. 
Neely's book rehabilitates Lincoln's reputation on civil liberties by 
showing that most of the arrests of civilians during the war were not 
politically motivated, in the narrow sense of the term. Indeed, the vast 
majority of the arrests were probably justifiable even by the standards 
of modem civil libertarians. But the book also demonstrates that Lin-
coln and his administration are not above reproach. Neely is clearly 
correct that the suspensions of habeas corpus were designed to allow 
the military and other federal officials maximum flexibility in the na-
tion's most unique crisis. But, if most arrests were for high purpose, 
some were crude attempts to suppress dissent and eliminate the polit-
ical opposition. The Civil War experience confirms that if truth is the 
first casualty of wartime, then civil liberties is surely the second. 57 
III. THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE 
The burden of Neely's argument is to demonstrate that military 
arrests of civilians during the Civil War were not essentially political. 
To show this, Neely has examined vast bodies of existing arrest, jail, 
and court records. He did not look at all the existing records - to do 
so might have taken another decade. Nor could he carefully examine 
every arrest, because many of the records from this period have disap-
peared and many arrests were never documented. The evidence he did 
examine thoroughly supports his contention that most of the wartime 
arrests were not political. He has put to rest the vision of Lincoln as a 
tyrant who used the military to suppress northern Democrats. Yet, in 
order to fully accept this proposition, one must examine the kind of 
evidence Neely has employed. 
Neely's book is based on extraordinary research into the arrest and 
prison records that remain from the Civil War. Much of this informa-
tion is buried in the National Archives or in scores of large, heavy 
volumes that make up the official record of the war. 58 His painstaking 
exploration of this evidence constitutes a great contribution to our un-
derstanding of civil liberties during the Civil War. 
Many arrest records for the War are incomplete or lost; therefore, 
one potential argument against Neely's analysis is that fuller records 
would better reveal the political nature of Lincoln's suppression of dis-
sent. To make this case as strong as possible, let us assume that during 
or immediately after the Civil War Lincoln's partisans systematically 
57. For a view of this in another context, see Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: 
Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
58. E.g., THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1880-
1902) (128 vols.) [hereinafter WAR OF THE REBELLION]. 
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destroyed the records of political arrests, leaving only those that are 
nonpolitical. This would undermine Neely's basic thesis. Does 
Neely's research truly reflect the nature of civilian arrests during the 
War? Without complete arrest and incarceration records, can we trust 
Neely's conclusions? The answer to both questions is an unqualified 
yes. More complete records might show a few nuances here and there, 
but such records would not reveal a dramatic alteration of the nature 
of the arrests. 
The reason for this conclusion is fairly simple. Most of the records 
Neely has examined describe the arrests of quite ordinary people. This 
is not surprising, because such people made up the bulk of those ar-
rested. Without these records, we would probably know little about 
these ordinary arrests. If all of the records had been destroyed or lost, 
no scholar could have reconstructed the nature of most arrests. How-
ever, if all of the arrest records that Neely used were unavailable, we 
could still study the political aspects of the arrests. Political arrests 
generated other kinds of documents and records. Evidence of political 
arrests jumps out of newspapers, speeches, and the voluminous private 
papers and memoirs of the many politicians, editors, and others who 
opposed the war. Other evidence comes from the papers, letters, and 
memoirs of supporters of Lincoln. In addition, Lincoln himself re-
ferred to the suspension of habeas corpus in a message to a special 
session of Congress59 and wrote a number of letters on the case of 
Clement Vallandigham, the Ohio copperhead politician arrested and 
then banished to the Confederacy.60 Similarly, Lincoln wrote letters 
about the suppression of newspapers61 and personally ordered the 
arrest of some newspaper editors. 62 The papers and memoirs of other 
prominent leaders, as well as published military records, would harbor 
similar correspondence about the arrest of famous individuals. Fi-
nally, there are records of prominent people who appealed their incar-
cerations or convictions to Lincoln or the courts. This large body of 
documents suggests that all the arrests of political figures are known 
59. Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) in 4 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra 
note 14, at 430-31. Although he did not mention the Merryman case or Taney's opinion by 
name, he clearly had both in mind in his discussion. McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 288. 
60. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to General Ambrose E. Burnside (May 29, 1863), in 6 
WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 237; Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Coming 
and Others (June 12, 1863), in 6 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 260, 266-67; Letter from 
Abraham Lincoln to Matthew Birchard and Others (June 29, 1863), in 6 WORKS OF LINCOLN, 
supra note 14, at 300-06. 
61. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to General John M. Schofield (July 13, 1863), in 6 WORKS 
OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 326 (chastising Schofield for arresting the editor of the Missouri 
Democrat); Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold (May 25, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 361 (writing about the revocation of the order suspending the Chi-
cago Times). 
62. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix, (May 18, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF LINCOLN, 
supra note 14, at 347-48 (ordering Dix to arrest the editors of the New York World and the 
Journal of Commerce and seize the papers' offices). 
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or can be discovered through existing sources. If there were another 
Lambdin Milligan, John Merryman, or Clement Vallandigham, we 
would know about him. 
The infrequency of political trials underscores Neely's thesis that 
the Lincoln administration did not engage in wholesale political re-
pression. If the missing military and jail records held the accounts of 
vast political suppression, we would surely find that evidence else-
where. We do not find such evidence, because the hoards of political 
arrests that opponents of Lincoln denounced never existed. 
IV. SUSPENDING HABEAS CORPUS IN TIMES OF REBELLION 
Any discussion of Lincoln and civil liberties is relevant to modem 
America. How we treat civilians in time of war is a measure of our 
Constitution's meaning. On this subject we can learn much from the 
Civil War experience. 
In order to draw any conclusions or lessons from the Civil War 
experience, we must look at two historical factors that make the Civil 
War experience for civilians different than any subsequent American 
conflict. First, we must consider how we define certain terms: this 
leads to the question of who was arrested and whether they should be 
considered civilians. Second, we must examine the nature of the war 
itself. This leads to a consideration of the various regions within the 
nation and whether the arrest of civilians differed in substance and 
constitutional significance in different parts of the nation. 
A. Defining the Terms - Were All the Civilians Really Civilians 
Our understanding of the war on the home front turns on defini-
tions of civilians, war zones, and arbitrary arrests. Neely demon-
strates that many of the "civilians" arrested tum out not to be civilians 
at all, at least not in the traditional sense. They are draft evaders, 
army deserters, Confederate citizens found in the North, or citizens of 
Confederate states arrested behind Union lines in the South. Many 
other arrested civilians were alleged Confederate supporters living in 
contested regions of Missouri, Maryland, and Kentucky and as such 
may have considered themselves to be citizens of the Confederacy. 
Neely also demonstrates that the vast majority of all civilians arrested 
lived in the border states or the Confederacy (pp. 137-38). 
Neely argues that while there were more arrests than most histori-
ans have presumed, "they had less significance for traditional civil lib-
erty than anyone has realized" (p. 138). At another point he argues 
that "most" of the arrests "had nothing to do with dissent or political 
opposition in the loyal states above the border states" (p. 137). This is 
true, but it misses at least one point. By suspending habeas corpus and 
allowing the military to arrest and incarcerate civilians without trial, 
the administration did undermine "traditional civil liberty," because 
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civil liberty means more than simply political liberty. It also encom-
passes fundamental notions of due process. 
Consider the problem of draft evaders. The law of the time consid-
ered draft evaders to be already in the military and thus subject to 
military arrest; therefore, draft age men were regularly seized. Neely 
would not classify these arrests as violating traditional civil liberty, 
because they were neither motivated by political ideology nor designed 
to suppress ideas or speech (pp. 131-33). In his view, these arrests 
were merely part of the conscription process. We might quarrel with 
the idea of a draft; scholars and civil libertarians may very well dislike 
conscription. But certainly if conscription is legal then arresting draft 
evaders is reasonable. If men subject to the draft were not considered 
civilians but were already technically in the military, then the military 
was the most appropriate body to arrest them. 
However, this analysis is not quite so simple. Neely admits that 
"government detectives or provost marshals were eager to arrest as 
bounty-jumpers any man of draft age holding substantial cash and 
boarding a train" (p. 131 ). As a result, many innocent men spent up 
to "eight days in a post guard house" (p. 132). This underscores the 
problem of distinguishing political from nonpolitical arrests, and as-
suming, as Neely does, that only politically motivated arrests violated 
civil liberties. 
Also complicated was the status of Southerners living in the North 
when the war began. If they retained their state allegiance they were 
citizens of an enemy nation in time of war. To arrest such people is no 
different from actions detaining citizens of Germany at the beginning 
of World War I and World War II.63 However, place of birth is a 
crude measure of allegiance, especially in a civil war. Some 
Southerners served in the Union Army or worked for the federal gov-
ernment. Moreover, even in wartime, national (or state) origins 
should hardly subject someone to arrest and incarceration without 
trial. 
Neely also dismisses the idea that the arrests of those who traded 
with the enemy could be considered violations of civil liberties (p. 
139). But innocent civilians mistakenly arrested for trading with the 
enemy certainly must have believed they had been denied due process 
and civil liberty. Probably wartime exigencies precluded those arbi-
trarily arrested (mistakenly or not) in the South from making a consti-
tutional claim. But the constitutionality of the arrests does not make 
them any less a deprivation of civil liberties. 
63. It is quite different, however, from the internment of Japanese Americans, most of whom 
were born in the United States and were citizens of the country. 
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B. Why Is This War Different from All Other Wars? 
Except for some naval encounters, the Civil War was fought en-
tirely on American soil, or at least on what Lincoln claimed still to be 
American soil. Lincoln's record on civil liberties must be examined in 
that context, something that critics of Lincoln have often failed to do. 
Neely, although far from critical of Lincoln, would have improved his 
argument by grounding it more firmly in the special circumstances of 
the Civil War. This analysis acknowledges that the Lincoln adminis-
tration denied basic civil liberties to many people, but it essentially 
finds the actions constitutionally legitimate because of the nature of 
the war. In this sense, Neely's argument is half right. He is correct 
that most of the arrests were not political, that they were justified by 
the exigencies of a civil war, and were thus constitutionally legitimate. 
But he is wrong in thinking that these arrests were not deprivations of 
civil liberties merely because they were not politically motivated. 
The first key to this analysis is coming to agreement on what one 
calls the conflict that took place between 1861 and 1865. Some people 
still call it the "War Between the States." This antiseptic name, which 
makes the war seem like a squabble over interstate politics and polit-
ical entities, hides the fratricidal nature of the war. Some lost-cause 
Southerners and a few Northerners64 refer to the conflict as the "War 
of Southern Independence."65 This certainly suggests the nature of 
Southern goals and implies the South was seeking independence from 
an oppressive Northern regime. 66 This designation also leads to the 
official name, according to the U.S. government at the time the war 
was fought: "The War of the Rebellion."67 The "Civil War" is closer 
to reality and properly conjures up notions of the brutal and bloody 
nature of the war. It is also a "neutral" term that does not imply a 
right and wrong side. This makes it the term of first choice in our own 
era. 
One should keep in mind'"the official designation-The War of the 
Rebellion - when examining Lincoln's actions. From Lincoln's per-
spective, the actions of Southerners were acts of treason, and the war 
was a rebellion. The U.S. Constitution provides for the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
64. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY 14 (1965). 
65. I once met a high school teacher from South Carolina who called the events of 1861-1865 
the "War of Yankee Aggression." Genteel Southerners to this day sometimes refer to the "late 
unpleasantness." 
66. That such a regime had never existed is beside the point. Before Lincoln's election only 
six presidents had never owned slaves. John Quincy Adams and to a lesser extent his father John 
Adams were the only presidents openly hostile to slavery. The four other nonslaveholding 
Northerners - Martin Van Buren, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan -
were extraordinarily sympathetic to the demands of the South. 
67. WAR OF THE REBELLION, supra note 58. 
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public Safety may require it."68 The War of 1861-1865 was clearly a 
"Rebellion" in the context of the Constitution. 
We should also remember that, at the time of the war, the United 
States had no national law enforcement agencies. The only federal law 
enforcement officers were a few marshals scattered about the country. 
They lacked the manpower and resources to deal with large numbers 
of lawbreakers. Thus, Lincoln turned to the army to arrest civilians 
because he had no other force to do the arresting. Similarly, he ini-
tially turned to martial law because no legislation was at his disposal 
to deal with the crisis. Congress was not in session when the war be-
gan and did not come back into session until July 1861, when it retro-
actively approved the steps Lincoln had taken to defend the 
Constitution and preserve the Union. Even if Congress had been in 
session, Lincoln would likely have used the military as he did because 
Congress could not have quickly created any civilian agency to deal 
with the crisis. 69 
C. The Public Safety Justification 
Under the Constitution, Lincoln (or Congress) may well have had 
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus everywhere in the 
United States where "the public Safety ... require[d] it." To under-
stand the public safety issue, however, it is necessary to divide the 
United States into three regions. 
1. The Confederate States 
The suspension of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law 
in the Confederacy was appropriate and constitutionally legitimate on 
three separate grounds. First, these eleven states were unequivocally 
in a state of "rebellion." They clearly fell under the rule for sus-
pending habeas corpus. Second, these states claimed to be out of the 
Union. They had, in effect, abdicated any claim to the protection of 
the Constitution. Lincoln's goal was to bring them back under the 
umbrella of the Constitution, but, until that happened, the Constitu-
tion clearly did not apply to them. Finally, these states were theaters 
of actual warfare. The Constitution clearly functions during a war, 
but it does not function fully on a battlefield or in a war zone. 70 
In the eleven states of the Confederacy, civil liberties as such had 
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
69. See J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL w AR AND RECONSTRUCTION 301-07 
(2d ed., 1969). In 1863 Congress further empowered Lincoln to act with impunity in using the 
army and declaring martial law to suppress the Rebellion. Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 
755 (1863). 
70. Obviously the power of Congress to regulate the armed forces applies to the battlefield, as 
does the constitutional authority of the President to act as Commander-in-Chief. But other 
rights, such as those protected in the first eight amendments, do not function in a battle zone. 
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been suspended by secession and armed rebellion. Thus, to talk about 
the suppression of civil liberties in the South during the War is a non 
sequitur. This means, for example, that even General Grant's infa-
mous order expelling Jews from the area of his command was consti-
tutional, to the extent it applied to the rebellious states. 71 Lincoln, of 
course, had the power to countermand the order, which he quickly 
did. The order offended Lincoln's sense of fairness and equality; 72 it 
was also bigoted, impolitic, and counterproductive. But, at least as it 
applied to Tennessee and Mississippi, Grant's order was not obviously 
unconstitutional, because the Constitution was no longer functioning 
in those places. 
The issue of emancipation, more than Grant's antisemitic order, 
illustrates the way in which the Constitution did not apply to the Con-
federate states. From the perspective of slaveowners, emancipation vi-
olated the due process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment73 
whether the freeing of their slaves resulted from the Second Confisca-
tion Act of 1862,74 Lincoln's more sweeping proclamation of 1863, or 
the actions of the Union army, which was the true agent of freedom 
during the War. Clearly, emancipation denied masters their "prop-
erty" as defined by their own states, the U.S. Constitution, and the 
Supreme Court. Like the right to habeas corpus, the right to property 
was a sacred, fundamental right of Americans. Arthur Lee articulated 
this view on the eve of the Revolution: "The right of property is the 
guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact 
to deprive them of their liberty."75 But, in the Confederacy the Con-
stitution no longer applied, military law did apply, and the Congress, 
President, and army were all free to convert slave property into free 
people. 
71. Ulysses S. Grant, 7 PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, supra note 35, at 50. Neely places 
Grant's order in the context of common antisemitic assumptions within the army and among 
many politicians and notes that "[a]nti-Semitism in the U.S. Army was a trait shared with other 
armies in the Western world in the second half of the nineteenth century." P. 109. Government 
officials noted when they arrested Jews, but "no other religion was" noted in arrest records. P. 
107. However, the issue of antisemitism, like other issues relating to civil liberties under Lincoln, 
is mixed and complex. The United States under Lincoln was extraordinarily progressive in its 
treatment of Jews compared to Great Britain and France at the same time. Well before Grant's 
expulsion order, Lincoln had appointed the first Jewish chaplain in U.S. military history, thirty 
years before the British did the same. P. 109. 
72. General Henry W. Halleck wrote Grant that Lincoln objected to Grant's order because it 
used "terms [which] proscribed an entire religious class, some of whom are fighting in our 
ranks .... " 6 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 71 n.1. 
73. "No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
74. See supra note 31. 
75. ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT 
BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA (1775), quoted in JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE 
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 
(1992). 
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2. The Loyal Slave States 
Four slave states - Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri 
- remained in the Union, as did a number of counties in Virginia, 
which were organized as the state of West Virginia in 1863. The fol-
lowing discussion focuses on the three most important of these: Mary-
land, Kentucky, and Missouri.76 These states were not officially in the 
Confederacy, but parts of them were obviously in a state of rebellion. 
Battles took place in all of them. Missouri was the site of some of the 
most horrible guerilla fighting of the war. The first Northern fatalities 
occurred in Baltimore, a hotbed of Confederate sympathizers, and 
Maryland was the site of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, Antie-
tam. Confederate troops invaded Kentucky throughout the early 
years of the war. Most important of all, the sentiments of the people 
in these states were divided. "Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri con-
tained large and resolute secessionist minorities."77 Had these states 
seceded, they would have enlarged the South's pool of white military 
manpower by forty-five percent, increased the Confederacy's manufac-
turing capacity by eighty percent, and vastly altered the strategic posi-
tion of the North by putting a Southern army on the Ohio and the 
upper Mississippi rivers.78 With Maryland in the Confederacy, the na-
tion's capital would have been cut off from the rest of the country. 
Although in the Union, these states provided large numbers of troops 
for the Confederacy. 79 Some legislators in all three wanted to secede, 
as did governors in Missouri and Kentucky. 80 
a. Missouri. Some of the most bitter and vicious fighting of the 
war took place in Missouri. 81 A large part of the population was in 
open or covert rebellion; a rump government was trying to secede. 
William C. Quantrill, who had a Confederate commission, com-
manded "some of the most psychopathic killers in American his-
tory. "82 After seizing the town of Lawrence, Kansas, Quantrill's 
76. Delaware remained Joyal and provided no appreciable number of troops for the South. 
McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 297. However, Confederate sympathizers in Delaware destroyed 
railroad tracks leading to Washington in the first month of the war. Id. at 286. Apparently no 
military trials or arrests occurred in Delaware. P. 173. Civilians were arrested in West Virginia, 
which was also the site of fierce fighting. However, in contrast to the other states under discus-
sion here, West Virginia's loyalty was made clear by its decision to secede from Virginia and 
remain in the Union. For a discussion of the war in West Virginia, see McPHERSON, supra note 
1, at 297-307. 
77. McPHERSON, supra note l, at 284. 
78. Id. "Little wonder that Lincoln was reported to have said that while he hoped to have 
God on his side, he must have Kentucky." Id. 
79. Id. at 293. 
80. Id. at 290, 293, 294. 
81. WILLIAM E. CONNELLEY, QUANTRILL AND THE BORDER WARS (1910); MICHAEL 
FELLMAN, INSIDE WAR: THE GUERRILLA CONFLICT IN MISSOURI DURING THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR (1989); McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 784-88. 
82. McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 785; see also ALBERT CASTLE, WILLIAM CLARK QUAN-
TRILL: His LIFE AND TIMES (1962). 
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Missouri-based gang of thugs murdered 182 unarmed men and boys. 
After this massacre General Thomas Ewing issued General Order No. 
11, which "ordered the evacuation of four counties in western Mis-
souri" (p. 47). In 1864 an offshoot of Quantrill's group, led by 
"Bloody Bill" Anderson, and including Frank and Jesse James, 
slaughtered hundreds of civilians and unarmed soldiers on furlough. 
After one battle Anderson and his troops executed, by shooting them 
in the head, wounded soldiers seeking to surrender. 83 In St. Louis a 
mob of Confederate sympathizers opened fire on Union soldiers in 
1861.84 In the early days of the war, Missouri's largest city was in 
chaos and the throes of Rebellion. As late as 1864 Confederate forces 
moved into Missouri. Missouri, then, barely differed from the Confed-
eracy. In fact, the Confederacy considered Missouri its twelfth state, 
and Missourians sat in the Confederate Senate. 85 
Neely shows that the application of martial law in Missouri was 
particularly harsh. Mistakes were made. Some innocent civilians 
were doubtless arrested, incarcerated, and in other ways harmed. 
Under General Ewing's Order No. 11 some loyal unionists were 
forced out of Southwest Missouri. More often, "persons who were 
disloyal in heart, mind, and outward behavior" were arrested and tried 
for the wrong crimes (p. 41). Some Missourians were tried for treason 
when they should have been tried for specific acts, like bridge burning 
or cutting telegraph wires. These mistakes show that the military was 
not equipped to handle the nuances of the law of treason. But they do 
not show a tyrannical government trying to destroy the liberty of the 
people. 
Were these actions illegitimate suppressions of civil liberties, or the 
results of civilians both being in the way of military operations and 
covertly participating in military actions in a theater of war? Given 
the guerrilla warfare in Missouri, a strong case exists for the latter 
interpretation. 
b. Kentucky. Kentucky declared itself neutral in the War, its 
governor openly sided with the South, and at least two fifths of the 
soldiers from the Bluegrass State wore Gray uniforms. 86 Early in the 
war Confederate troops under General Leonidas Polk, a distinguished 
West Point graduate, invaded Kentucky. This invasion violated Ken-
tucky's "neutrality" and led the legislature to declare its support for 
the Union, over the objections of Governor Beriah Magoffin, who then 
tried to set up a rump Confederate state government. 87 Meanwhile, 
General Polk ran into barely trained Illinois volunteers led by an un-
83. McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 787. 
84. Id. at 291. 
85. Id. at 293. 
86. Id. at 293-94. 
87. Id. at 296-97. 
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known and undistinguished Union commander named Ulysses S. 
Grant. Kentucky remained in the Union because of Confederate mis-
calculations and Grant's superior generalship. But for the next few 
years the state would be a battleground. 
Given the circumstances of Kentucky politics - with the duly 
elected governor proclaiming his state out of the Union and forty per-
cent of its young men in Confederate uniforms, one can easily argue 
that the state was in rebellion. Thus, the suspension of habeas corpus 
there seems legitimate. The only question might be whether a suspen-
sion should have applied to all the state. That is, should areas firmly 
under Union control have been considered "in rebellion"? But until 
the end of the war, could any of the slave-holding states stand firmly 
under Union control? Federal troops, the Congress, and the President 
never doubted the answer to this question. 
c. Maryland. To reach Washington for his inauguration, Abra-
ham Lincoln had to pass through Baltimore, "a city rife with secession 
sympathizers."88 Assassination plots forced Lincoln to travel through 
the city incognito at 3:00 a.m. 89 At this time the national government 
provided no protection for the president-elect. Without a secret ser-
vice, F.B.I., or any other federal police system, Lincoln was on his 
own. 
Lincoln reached Washington safely, but some Union troops were 
less fortunate. On April 19, 1861, the 6th Massachusetts regiment ar-
rived in Baltimore, on its way to protect Washington. The troops had 
to change trains in Baltimore, and that required them to actually 
march across town from one station to another. Confederate sympa-
thizers attacked the Massachusetts soldiers, and by the time the regi-
ment had fought its way to the train station, four soldiers and twelve 
civilians were dead.90 That night local authorities burned railroad 
bridges connecting Baltimore to Washington. The secessionist mayor 
of Baltimore claimed this was done to prevent Union troops from riot-
ing in his city. But to Lincoln, "[b]ridge-burning looked like plain 
treason" that left Washington "defenseless and cut off from the rest of 
the North" (p. 5). In the wake of these events, Lincoln issued his first 
order suspending habeas corpus, which encompassed the railroad lines 
between Washington and Philadelphia. Lincoln's order would later 
apply to all east coast railroad lines. Federal troops would later arrest 
John Merryman under this suspension order. 
Under these circumstances, Merryman's arrest seems justified. At 
the time a large hostile army stood within a day's march of the na-
tion's capital. Loyal troops were on their way to protect the national 
government and preserve the Constitution. Maryland itself was wa-
88. Id. at 261. 
89. Id. at 261-62; OATES, supra note 1, at 211-12. 
90. McPHERSON, supra note 1, at 285. 
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vering in its commitment to the Union, and in Baltimore neither local 
nor state authorities were willing to protect vital transportation links 
between Washington and the North. John Merryman was helping to 
destroy these links while trying to recruit soldiers for the enemy. It 
would be hard to imagine a situation more perfectly designed to fit the 
provision in the Constitution allowing for the suspension of habeas 
corpus and the use of federal troops. 
While mobs threatened troops and railroad lines, politicians nearly 
brought Maryland out of the Union, and the governor declared the 
state neutral.91 Lincoln accepted neutrality in Kentucky, and indeed 
it worked to his advantage when Confederate troops invaded the state 
first. But neutrality in Maryland was impossible, because Union 
troops had to cross Maryland to reach Washington. Moreover, pro-
Confederate legislators in Maryland were not content with neutrality. 
In August they denounced Lincoln and the war effort and scheduled a 
special September session, when they hoped to win a secession vote. 
Federal troops blocked access to Frederick, Maryland, where the leg-
islature was to meet, and then arrested thirty-one secessionist legisla-
tors before they could reach the meeting. 92 Others arrested at the time 
included the mayor of Baltimore. Not surprisingly, with most of the 
secessionists absent, the legislature supported the Union. Most of 
those arrested remained in federal custody until February 1862, but 
some did not gain their freedom until December 1862. Meanwhile, in 
the November 1861 election, with the secessionists still in jail, the 
Union party won a "smashing victory."93 
This is perhaps the most political of the military arrests of civilians 
during the war. State legislators were on their way to conduct public 
business. The army arrested them so they could not conduct that 
business. But once arrested they were not released until after the next 
election. Neely suggests that these arrests "were more likely harmful 
than helpful to the administration's cause by supplying an issue to the 
opposition. In some counties, in fact, the opposition called itself 'the 
habeas corpus party' " (p. 18). That, of course, is beside the point; the 
issue is the legal or constitutional basis for the arrests, not their polit-
ical efficacy. 
This is surely a close call, but, under the circumstances, the initial 
arrests do not seem constitutionally out of bounds. The arrests were 
not to prevent an opposition party from holding office, nor were they 
to stop the normal political process. On the contrary, they were 
designed to stop an illegal action - secession - after a rebellion had 
already begun. 
If the suspension of habeas corpus was legal and constitutional, as 
91. Id. at 287. 
92. Id. at 288-89. 
93. Id. at 289. 
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I have argued, the arrests of the Maryland legislators were permissible. 
But does that make their incarceration legitimate? Here, it seems to 
me, is where the excesses of the Lincoln administration become most 
clear. The government acted reasonably to prevent the secession of 
Maryland through military intervention. If Lincoln could use troops 
to bring Virginia back into the Union, surely he could use troops to 
prevent Maryland from leaving the Union. 
But, once the army had prevented a vote on secession, was there 
any justification for keeping the legislators in jail? I think not. The 
purpose of the incarceration was to prevent a vote on secession and to 
keep Maryland in the Union. The arrests accomplished this. The 
state legislators had not, at that point, done anything to make war on 
the government or to rebel. Once the threat of secession was over, 
little justification remained for keeping the legislators in jail. Further 
incarceration seems to have been politically motivated. 
3. The North 
By the end of the War most of the nation had felt the suspension of 
habeas corpus and the long arm of the Lincoln administration. Ini-
tially Lincoln suspended the writ in the North along the east coast 
railroad lines (p. 51). Under this order - as well as through the acts 
of individual military officers, federal officials, and state actors - the 
military had arrested and held numerous civilians in the North on var-
ious charges. In August and September 1862, Lincoln and Secretary 
of War Edwin M. Stanton suspended the writ for the entire nation (pp. 
52-53). This set into motion what Neely calls "the lowest point for 
civil liberties in U.S. history to that time, and one of the lowest in all 
of American history. It showed the Lincoln administration at its 
worst - amateurish, disorganized, and rather unfeeling" (p. 53). 
Were these suspensions constitutional? Were they justified? Were 
they merely a manipulation of raw power for the purpose of political 
gain? These questions lie at the heart of the analysis of civil liberties 
under Lincoln. 
The nation was in a state of civil war - a rebellion was in pro-
gress. The constitutional provision for the suspension of habeas 
corpus "in Cases of Rebellion" is not limited by geography.94 How-
ever, it is limited to "when ... the public Safety may require it."95 
The constitutional question, then, was whether the "public Safety" re-
quired the suspension everywhere. In many cases the public safety did 
not require it. What threats there were to the public safety in Maine is 
hard to imagine, although Lincoln suspended habeas corpus along the 
railroad line from Washington to the Canadian border. How did the 
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
95. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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"public Safety" require the arrest of newspaper editors in upstate New 
York, northern Ohio, or Maine?96 In the North, many of the arrests 
were simply for statements hostile to the administration. In one set of 
records involving 154 persons, only thirteen "were arrested for words 
they were alleged to have spoken or written about the war" (p. 132). 
Of these "[o]nly two cases were 'politically' significant" (p. 132). Most 
of the other thirteen were drunken boasts or "expressions of delight at 
the assassination of President Lincoln" (p. 132). 
Neely presents this evidence to clear Lincoln of the charge that the 
arrests of civilians were politically motivated. Most of them were 
not.97 However, the arrest of citizens who denounced Lincoln and his 
administration suggests the state of mind of public officials during and 
immediately after the War. It also illustrates the profound danger of 
allowing the government to arrest arbitrarily people who disagree with 
it. 
The thirteen arrests mentioned above (and the other arrests for 
opinion found in other records) were clearly motivated by political 
concerns. But the small number of such arrests do not constitute the 
stuff of a reign of terror or an imposition of tyranny that Democrats 
complained of during the War and that lost-cause partisans have com-
plained of in subsequent years. Neely argues that "most" arrests "had 
nothing to do with dissent or political opposition in the loyal states 
above the border states" (p. 137). But the import of this is not as clear 
as Neely would have us believe. He has found vast numbers of 
nonpolitical arrests, but that does not necessarily diminish the impor-
tance of the political arrests about which we already knew. If "most" 
of the arrests he describes were for nonpolitical reasons, then some 
clearly were not. That Neely has found hundreds, or thousands, of 
legitimate and nonpolitical arrests does not justify the illegitimate 
ones. 
V. PRESS SUPPRESSION 
Curiously, for a book on civil liberties in wartime, The Fate of Lib-
erty does not examine the suppression of the press under Lincoln. 98 
This is one of the major weaknesses of the book. Instead of discussing 
the issue, he notes that Robert S. Harper's Lincoln and the Press dealt 
with cases involving the press (p. 28). But this book, published in 
1951, is somewhat outdated and untouched by any of the vast recon-
96. P. 23; HARPER, supra note 36, at 127-29, 193. 
97. Certainly it is absurd to blame Lincoln for the arrests of those who took delight in his 
death. A New Jersey man, for example, was arrested when he "draped his hog pen in black for 
Lincoln's funeral." P. 132. 
98. His inadequate discussion of the arrest of the editors of the New York World and the 
Journal of Commerce is offered as part of a larger discussion of fraud during the War. The 
newspapermen arrested did not make Neely's rather long list of "Prisoners of State." 
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siderations of press freedom of the past forty years. Furthermore, this 
offhand reference to the press does not explain the significance of press 
suppression during wartime. 
As with other aspects of civil liberties, some definitions are in or-
der. The army and other branches of the federal government sup-
pressed papers in areas of the South that fell back into Union hands 
and in border states. This makes sense and seems not terribly surpris-
ing or outrageous. These were war zones, and even most First 
Amendment absolutists concede that full freedom of the press does 
not extend to the battlefield and the front.99 For the same reason, 
evidence of censorship by the military does not prove the Lincoln ad-
ministration was tyrannical. By the standards of modern warfare, 
where the military dictates which "pool reporters" will get to the 
front, the press during the Civil War was remarkably unfettered. 
Most suppression of the press took place in or near the war zones. 
Neely notes that, despite the horrible border war in Missouri, only one 
newspaper editor was tried by a military commission for "mere polit-
ical beliefs or freedom of expression" (p. 44). "He was accused of pub-
lishing information for the benefit of the enemy and of encouraging 
resistance to the U.S. government" (p. 44). His punishment was ban-
ishment. Neely notes that the army also arrested "several Missouri 
editors" in the early months of the war (p. 28). In fact, by the end of 
the war at least a dozen Missouri editors had been arrested or had 
their papers closed. 100 Nevertheless, shutting down a press in Mis-
souri was not the same as closing one in Chicago or New York. Mis-
souri was a war zone. Fighting was going on everywhere. The army's 
mission was to keep Missouri in the Union. 
Rather than talk about the suppression of the press, Neely merely 
notes in passing that before February 1862 military authorities ar-
rested twelve different newspapermen, plus "several Missouri edi-
tors." 101 Elsewhere he notes the arrest of the odd editor, here and 
there (pp. 58-59). This fits with his theme that most arrests were not 
political. Even if only a few editors had been arrested, however, such 
an arrest, or the closing of a newspaper, obviously had a more dra-
99. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes noted in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931), "[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruc-
tion to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number 
and location of troops." 283 U.S. at 716. For more recent commentary, see THOMAS I. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). "[C]ommunications dealing with mili-
tary movements in wartime are plainly subject to military censorship. Likewise, dissemination of 
information classified as a military secret is subject to controls based on the requirements of the 
military system, although the issue of what constitutes a military secret may be subject to civilian 
judicial review." Id. at 58. 
100. HARPER, supra note 36, at 141-48 (authorities also banned another dozen or so papers 
from other states). 
101. P. 28. At least six Missouri papers were closed and some of their editors arrested in this 
period. HARPER, supra note 36, at 142-44. 
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matic impact on civil liberties than the arrest of a civilian charged with 
speaking out against the war. 
The fact is that not just a few or "several" editors were arrested. 
Federal authorities arrested some editors simply because of their anti-
administration and antiwar activities. The arrest of the Missouri edi-
tor who was allegedly aiding the enemy seems reasonable, given that 
the war was raging there. But little justification exists for the arrests 
of editors in places as remote from the front as Malone (New York), 
Long Island (New York), Columbus (Ohio), Paris (Illinois), Dubuque 
(Iowa), Belfast (Maine), and Canton (Ohio). 102 In addition to official 
suppression, mobs that were often led by soldiers destroyed many 
other papers. Some soldiers faced disciplinary action for their attacks 
on antiwar papers, but soldiers and officers who attacked anti-adminis-
tration presses were generally not disciplined. 103 
The arrest of Archibald McGregor, the editor of the Stark County 
Democrat, published in Canton, Ohio, illustrates the political nature of 
press suppression during the war and the importance of Neely's failure 
to discuss this issue. In August 1861, a mob destroyed McGregor's 
office. McGregor identified all fourteen men in the mob, including the 
leader, an army lieutenant who was also the son of Canton's mayor. 
For this reason the Canton city council agreed to reimburse McGregor 
for his loss. But in October 1862, the army arrested McGregor on 
unspecified charges. The Republican postmaster of Canton accompa-
nied the soldiers who arrested McGregor, making the political impli-
cations of this arrest obvious. Three weeks later the military released 
McGregor.104 
Arrests like this one reveal the political dangers of Lincoln's poli-
cies. The potential for suppression was present throughout the war, 
and created what twentieth-century constitutional scholars immedi-
ately recognize as a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Never-
theless, despite these examples, during the war a vigorous opposition 
press constantly criticized Lincoln, military policy, and the whole pur-
pose of the war itself. The Springfield Register called Lincoln's reelec-
tion "the heaviest calamity that ever befell this nation" and a "farewell 
to civil liberty."105 But the paper was not suppressed. The opposition 
press in the North was vibrant, vigorous, and often vicious. 
Lincoln seems to have understood, at a political level if not neces-
sarily a constitutional one, that a free press was important. He also 
understood that unbridled suppression of the opposition was probably 
politically counterproductive, especially in the North, where secession 
was impossible and support for the Confederacy weak. Thus, when 
102. P. 27; HARPER, supra note 36, at 128-29, 298, 225, 341, 148, 193, 198. 
103. HARPER, supra note 36, at 151-52, 198, 230-33. 
104. Id. at 197-98. 
105. Id. at 224. 
May 1993] The Great Emancipator 1377 
General Ambrose Burnside suppressed the anti-administration Chi-
cago Times, Lincoln quickly interceded.106 Lincoln was "embar-
rassed" by this suppression, which he saw as "the question between 
what was due the Military service on the one hand, and the Liberty of 
the Press on the other."101 
On the other hand, Lincoln personally ordered the arrest of the 
editors of the New York World and the Journal of Commerce after 
they published a bogus presidential proclamation.108 Lincoln ordered 
Major General John A. Dix to arrest the editors for publishing a "false 
and spurious proclamation, purporting to be signed by the President, 
and to be countersigned by the Secretary of State, which publication is 
of a treasonable nature, designed to give aid and comfort to the ene-
mies of the United States .... " 109 Neely's persuasive analysis shows 
that the administration closed the papers because it truly believed the 
papers were involved with a Confederate plot (pp. 104-05). When the 
hoax was revealed, Lincoln rescinded this order.110 It turns out the 
hoax had a more mundane root - two newspapermen planted the 
false proclamation hoping to make a killing in the gold market by 
manipulating the news. The World quickly reopened, and it continued 
to attack the administration. Throughout the War, the administration 
did nothing to stop these assaults.111 
VI. LINCOLN AND THE CONSTITUTION 
In the end, Lincoln's record on the press is in fact mixed, as is his 
overall record on civil liberties. Neely's careful combing of the extant 
archives shows that most of those arrested were not political activists. 
Generally, but not always, the administration recognized the distinc-
tion between speech and action in the North. In the border states and 
106. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold, (May 25, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 361 (writing about the suppression of the Chicago Times). Most of 
the correspondence and other material connected to this case is conveniently collected in FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 229-32. Lin-
coln also chastised General John M. Schofield for arresting the editor of the Missouri Democrat, 
which despite its name was a Republican paper. The Democrat had not criticized the administra-
tion, but rather had published a letter Lincoln had written to Schofield that could have embar-
rassed the General and the administration. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to General John M. 
Schofield, (July 13, 1863), in 6 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 326; HARPER, supra note 
36, at 144-46. 
107. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold, (May 25, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 361. 
108. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix, (May 18, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF LIN-
COLN, supra note 14, at 347-48. Most of the correspondence and other material connected to 
this case is conveniently collected in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WAR-
REN COURT, supra note 34, at 232-47. 
109. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix, (May 18, 1864), in 7 WORKS OF LIN-
COLN, supra note 14, at 347-48. 
110. HARPER, supra note 36, at 297. 
111. Id. at 297-303. 
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in the South, the distinction itself was less clear because the War was a 
rebellion. 
Neely is clearly right that Lincoln was not a dictator. The Demo-
cratic Party functioned throughout the War, electing opposition and 
antiwar candidates to office. Lincoln fully expected to lose the election 
of 1864, and yet he did not try to influence the outcome by massive 
partisan arrests. Indeed, in an 1864 proclamation suspending habeas 
corpus in Kentucky, Lincoln carefully explained that he did not want 
to interfere in the upcoming elections (p. 209). Nevertheless, the in-
carceration of Maryland legislators during the election of 1861 and the 
Milligan case also show that some arrests were decidedly calculated to 
affect elections. 112 
Neely's exhaustive work also clearly indicates that many arrests of 
civilians were probably justifiable. The Constitution, after all, did al-
low for the suspension of habeas corpus in times of rebellion. The 
Civil War was certainly that. Nevertheless, unjustified deprivations of 
liberty took place under Lincoln. Some newspapers were closed, inno-
cent civilians were jailed without trial, and some people in custody 
were grievously mistreated.113 But compared to the trampling of civil 
liberties in other nations during civil wars, what happened under Lin-
coln seems almost innocent and naive. There were no mass executions 
or even summary killings of civilians. Today we remember John Mer-
ryman because Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney's writ of habeas 
corpus directing his release. But, in another context, Merryman's 
arrest is astounding because he had access to an attorney. As Harold 
Hyman and William Wiecek have noted, this was "a globally unique 
privilege for a civilian in military custody."114 That the army allowed 
Merryman's attorney to travel from Baltimore to Washington in order 
to appeal directly to Taney, and then allowed Taney to hold court in 
Baltimore and openly challenge military authority, is in itself remarka-
ble. No one later thought to interfere with Taney when he published 
his opinion castigating Lincoln. This could hardly happen in very 
many other places during a civil war. 
Lincoln's policies also seem mild, reasonable, and much more 
firmly grounded in the Constitution when compared to the policies of 
subsequent presidents in other American wars. During World War II 
the United States was not invaded115 and certainly no "rebellion" took 
place. Popular support for a war has never been as high. Yet Frank-
lin Roosevelt had no qualms about authorizing the suspension of lib-
erty for nearly 120,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry or birth 
112. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
113. Pp. 109-12 (describing the torture of some suspected deserters from the Army). 
114. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 43, at 239. 
115. The Japanese attacked or invaded some territories such as Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and 
the Philippines, but none of these actions constituted an invasion of the United States. 
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merely because of their national origins. When planning the Japanese-
American internment, John McCloy, the prominent Wall Street law-
yer then serving as Assistant Secretary of War, declared, "'if it is a 
question of the safety of the country [and] the Constitution. . . . Why 
the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.' " 116 
For Lincoln, the Constitution was never a "scrap of paper," even if 
he had no clearly thought-out theories of constitutional rights and 
"probably did not have a conscious theory of [constitutional] interpre-
tation.'' 117 Neely argues that Lincoln came to the presidency with few 
strong constitutional principles. He had rarely discussed or consid-
ered the Constitution in his earlier political career (pp. 211-13). Even 
his discussions of slavery were relatively light on constitutional issues 
(pp. 214-15), especially when compared to the highly developed con-
stitutional arguments against slavery.118 As Neely notes, "[e]ven to 
survey Lincoln's ideas on the Constitution is to run the risk of overem-
phasizing his constitutional concerns, because thinking in constitu-
tional ways did not come naturally to him" (p. 215). 
Lincoln was a railroad lawyer, a practitioner. He seems not to 
have discovered the Constitution, in any serious way, until Taney's 
Dred Scott opinion119 forced him to think about the role of the 
Supreme Court in interpreting that document. 120 As I noted earlier, 
unlike other leading Republicans, Lincoln had not been involved in 
antislavery litigation.121 Thus he had not developed a respect for the 
writ of habeas corpus from constantly using it to try to protect blacks 
seized as fugitive slaves. Because he was never part of the antislavery 
movement, he never came to appreciate the value of free speech and 
free press. Throughout the antebellum period abolitionists struggled 
for the right to express their views.122 In Alton, Illinois, not far from 
where Lincoln grew to maturity, the abolitionist publisher Elijah P. 
Lovejoy died at the hands of a proslavery mob while he defended his 
printing press.123 Salmon P. Chase entered the abolitionist movement 
by serving as counsel for an abolitionist printer whose press a mob 
116. John McCloy, quoted in ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPA-
NESE-AMERICANS 35 (1975). 
117. Paludan, supra note 23, at 13. 
118. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN .AMERICAN 
LAW AND PoLmCS (1978); FINKELMAN, supra note 7; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF 
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977). 
119. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
120. See Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858), 
in 2 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 461. 
121. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
122. RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CON-
TROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1963). 
123. Ironically, the contemporary report of the riots was published by one William S. Lin-
coln. WILLIAM s. LINCOLN, ALTON TRIALS (1838), reprinted in ABOLITIONISTS IN NORTHERN 
COURTS 281 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). 
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destroyed. 124 Such a background gave him, and other antislavery ac-
tivists, an insight into civil liberties and constitutional rights that Lin-
coln lacked. But, while Lincoln lacked constitutional experience and 
even interest, he never lacked political sense. He understood the im-
portance of maintaining democratic institutions, even if he was uncon-
cerned about the constitutional theory behind them. 
VII. BEYOND LINCOLN 
Neely's book forces us to rethink Lincoln's reputation as a de-
stroyer of civil liberties. The book demonstrates that during wartime 
- especially during a civil war - some opponents of the government 
are likely to be oppressed. Neely also shows that grievous and painful 
mistakes were made. The book describes instances of brutal jailers, 
arbitrary prosecutors, and bigoted, stupid military commanders. But 
what is most surprising is how few actual deprivations of civil liberties 
took place during the war. For a civil war, when spies and enemy 
agents were often indistinguishable from the general population, the 
record of the Lincoln administration seems surprisingly good. Lincoln 
and those under him were far more sensitive to civil liberties than 
Woodrow Wilson 125 or Franklin Roosevelt.126 
The arrests and violations of civil liberties under Lincoln illustrate 
the propensity for prosecutorial zeal during wartime. Compared to 
the massive arrests during World War I, or the Red Scare of 1919, the 
Lincoln administration comes off rather well. This is especially true 
when we are reminded, as Neely might have done more emphatically 
in his book, that a civil war is quite different from an international war 
and overwhelmingly different from any domestic crisis that might 
have existed during the Red Scare. 
In 1862 Lincoln urged a group of loyal slaveowners from Dela-
ware, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and West Virginia to support a 
scheme of compensated emancipation.127 Otherwise, he warned, "the 
incidents of the war can not be avoided" and the longer the war con-
tinued the more likely it would be that slavery would be "extinguished 
by mere friction and abrasion- by the mere incidents of the war."128 
Ironically, the same "friction and abrasion" that helped destroy 
slavery also threatened personal and civil liberties. The lesson of the 
124. FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 160; BETIY FLADELAND, JAMES GILLESPIE BIRNEY: 
SLAVEHOLDER TO ABOLmONisr 142-44 (1955). 
125. On Wilson and civil liberties see PAUL MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF 
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1978). 
126. Roosevelt had few qualms about denying fundamental civil liberties to over 100,000 
Americans of Japanese ancestry. DANIEIS, supra note 116, at 44-45; PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE 
AT WAR 63 (1983); see Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942). 
127. Appeal to Border State Representatives to Favor Compensated Emancipation (July 12, 
1862) in 5 WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 14, at 317-18. 
128. Id. at 318. 
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Lincoln years, taught well by Neely's book, is that war threatens indi-
vidual liberties, even when the chief executive is sensitive to democ-
racy and disinclined to be oppressive. When the chief executive cares 
less for freedom, or worse yet is openly hostile to individuals and orga-
nizations dedicated to its preservation, the climate during wartime can 
become truly oppressive. 
